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1053 
QUALIFIED DOES NOT MEAN OVER-QUALIFIED: THE ADA’S 




“It’s not our disabilities, it’s our abilities that count.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Laws are enacted for the betterment of society as a whole.2  
One such law is the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).3  
Congress states in the ADA that its purpose is “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”4  Additionally, Congress 
expresses the need “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.”5  The ADA “ensures that the Federal Government plays 
a central role in enforcing the standards established . . . on behalf of 
individuals with disabilities.”6  The federal circuit courts have fallen 
short of fulfilling the ADA’s purpose in relation to reassignment as a 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2023, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. 
Criminal Justice, St. John’s University – Staten Island.  I would like to thank 
Professor Michelle Zakarin and the Law Review staff for their guidance and 
support throughout this process.  I would also like to thank my parents Dorothy and 
Steven who set me on this path of infinite possibilities.  Lastly, I would like to 
thank my fiancé Wess who has been by my side through it all. 
1 Quotes and a Story, PEARL BUCK CTR., https://pearlbuckcenter.com/quotes-and-a-
story-on-dis-ability (last visited Mar. 29, 2021) (quoting Chris Burke). 
2 See Tom Head, Why We Need Laws to Exist in Society, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 16, 
2021), https://www.thoughtco.com/why-laws-exist-721458 (discussing the reasons 
why laws exist). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
4 § 12101 (b)(1). 
5 § 12101(b)(2). 
6 § 12101(b)(3). 
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reasonable accommodation.7  This Note will discuss the need for an 
unequivocal resolution as to whether an employee with a disability, 
seeking reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable 
accommodation, is forced to compete for the position or whether 
reassignment is mandatory.  
The lack of direction from the Supreme Court has caused a 
noticeable divide throughout the circuit courts which has led to the 
unequal treatment of disabled employees.  Currently, the Fifth,8 
Eighth,9 and Eleventh10 Circuits do not require mandatory 
reassignment to a vacant position without competition.  Conversely, 
the Seventh,11 Tenth,12 and D.C. Circuits13 hold that reassignment to 
a vacant position is mandatory even in the face of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory hiring policy seeking the most qualified applicant.  
The Fourth Circuit14 has recently decided that reassignment in 
violation of Lowe’s merit-based advancement system would not be 
reasonable.15  
Part II of this Note will review the ADA, including 
background, definitions, legislative intent, and Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) guidance.  Part III of this Note 
will discuss the Supreme Court’s limited guidance.  Part IV will 
evaluate the Circuit Courts that decided reassignment should require 
competition including a recent case from the Fourth Circuit.  Part V 
of this Note will examine the Circuit Courts that support mandatory 
reassignment.  Part VI will interpret what qualified means under the 
ADA and why employers should not use this as a pretext to 
discriminate against disabled employees.  Finally, this Note will 
consider why reassignment should be mandatory. 
 
7 See infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text. 
8 Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995). 
9 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007). 
10 EEOC v. St Joseph’s Hosp. Inc., 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016). 
11 EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). 
12 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). 
13 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
14 Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004 (4th Cir. 2020).  
15 Id. at 1016. 
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II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A. Background and Legislative Intent 
Congress intended that the ADA promote equality for 
disabled Americans by assuring them the opportunity to live 
independently and with economic self-sufficiency.16  In furtherance 
of this goal, the ADA seeks to eliminate discrimination against 
disabled individuals.17  Under this statute, a disabled individual is one 
whose activities are substantially limited by “a physical or mental 
impairment.”18   
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against 
“a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees . . . and privileges of employment.”19  A qualified 
individual with a disability is one who can accomplish the essential 
functions of the job which he or she holds or desires, with or without 
an accommodation.20  The term “essential functions” is used to 
describe fundamental job tasks.21  Discrimination under the ADA 
includes not providing reasonable accommodations for a qualified 
disabled employee’s physical or mental disabilities.22 
Instead of defining “reasonable accommodations,” the ADA 
provides a list of examples which may include: 
(A) making existing facilities used by employees 
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 
disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or 
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant 
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or 
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the 
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
 
16 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). 
17 Id. (b)(1). 
18 §12102 (1)(A); see also id. (2) (describing major life activities). 
19 § 12112(a). 
20 § 12111(8). 
21 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
337. 
22 § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
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similar accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities.23 
Under the ADA discrimination may also include denying a 
disabled qualified employee access to certain opportunities within the 
company, if the denial is based on a reasonable accommodation 
request.24  The ADA requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodations for disabled employees unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose a hardship on the 
employer.25  Additionally, the statute defines undue hardship as an 
action that is significantly difficult to accomplish or a considerable 
expense.26   
The ADA requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodations in order to erase barriers created by a disability.27  
This legislation instructs employers to make decisions based on an 
individual employee’s qualifications, and not on “presumptions as to 
what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do.”28  
Employers are compelled to reasonably accommodate applicants or 
employees who are “otherwise qualified” for a job.29  The term 
“otherwise qualified” is used to describe a disabled person who meets 
all the criteria for a job, except the criteria that cannot be met due to 
his or her disability, but may be met if a reasonable accommodation 
is given.30 
 
23 § 12111(9). 
24 § 12112 (b)(5)(B). 
25 Id. (b)(5)(A). 
26 § 12111 (10)(A); id. (B) (“In determining whether an accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include- (i) 
the nature and cost of the accommodation needed; (ii) the overall financial 
resources of the facility; (iii) the number of persons employed at such facility; (iv) 
the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise on the operation of 
the facility; (v) the employer's overall financial resources; and (vi) the type of the 
employer's operation.”). 
27 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 65. 
28 Id. at 102. 
29 Id. at 64. 
30 Id. at 64-65. 
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B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
Guidance 
The EEOC was vested with enforcement and regulatory 
authority by the ADA.31  Although the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance 
is less than controlling authority, it does “constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”32   
When examining reasonable accommodations, EEOC 
regulations are similar to the ADA prohibitions, stating that 
employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations unless 
there is an undue hardship to the employer.33  Unlike the statute, the 
EEOC regulations attempt to provide a more meaningful definition of 
reasonable accommodation, stating that a reasonable accommodation 
means: 
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application 
process that enable a qualified applicant with a 
disability to be considered for the position such 
qualified applicant desires; or (ii) Modifications or 
adjustments to the work environment, or the manner 
or circumstances under which the position held or 
desired is customarily performed, that enable an 
individual with a disability who is qualified to perform 
the essential functions of that position, or (iii) 
Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered 
entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal 
benefits and privileges or employment as are enjoyed 
by its other similarly situated employees without 
disabilities.34  
The EEOC regulations also include a non-exhaustive list of 
reasonable accommodations and add guidance to determine 
appropriate reasonable accommodations, noting that absent a 
 
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117, 12205a. 
32 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Meritor 
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). 
33 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (2011). 
34 § 1630.2(o)(1). 
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hardship, employers are required to provide an accommodation for 
qualified disabled employees.35 
 Additionally, the EEOC Enforcement Guidance attempts to 
clarify the responsibilities of employers and rights of disabled 
individuals regarding reasonable accommodation requests.36  The 
EEOC’s guidance indicates that reasonable accommodations are a 
“fundamental statutory requirement because of the nature of 
discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities.”37  More 
specifically, the EEOC guidance elaborates on the accommodation of 
reassignment.38  The EEOC guidance states that reassignment as a 
reasonable accommodation “must be provided” if an employee can 
no longer carry out the essential function of his or her job with or 
without an accommodation, unless there is an undue hardship to the 
employer.39  The guidance notes that a disabled employee must be 
qualified, meaning that he or she must meet the “requisite skill, 
experience, education, and other job-related requirements,” and also 
be able to “perform the essential function of the new position.”40  The 
EEOC guidance makes sure to specifically point out that an employee 
“does not need to be the best qualified individual” in order to be 
reassigned.41  Additionally, the guidance indicates that reassignment 
to a vacant position is the reasonable accommodation of “last 
resort.”42  This accommodation is utilized when employees can no 
longer carry out the necessary functions of the job they hold.43  The 
transfer of a qualified employee to a vacant position may prevent loss 
of employment and allow the employer to keep a valuable worker, 
just as legislators intended.44  
 
35 Id. at (2)-(4). 
36 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable 
Accommodation & Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
NO. 915.002 (2002), 2002 WL 31994335.  
37 Id. at 2. 
38 See id. at 20-24. 
39 Id. at 20. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 20.  
43 Id. 
44 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 63. 
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III. SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The United States Supreme Court supplied some direction for 
disabled employees requesting a reassignment in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. 
Barnett.45  Robert Barnett worked as a customer service agent for 
U.S. Air46 for ten years.47  Barnett suffered a back injury when he 
was working as a cargo handler for U.S. Air in 1990.48  Once he 
returned to work, Barnett realized he was unable to perform the 
physical aspects of his position.49  Barnett was able to use his 
seniority to transfer to a position in the mail room.50  In 1992, Barnett 
learned that “two employees with greater seniority planned to 
exercise their seniority right to transfer to the mail room.”51  This 
would eliminate Barnett’s mail room position and limit him to cargo 
area jobs.52  Barnett requested he be allowed to remain in the mail 
room as an accommodation and was granted this request for five 
months while his claim was evaluated.53  In January of 1993, Barnett 
was removed from his position in the mail room and placed on 
leave.54  Barnett filed a complaint with the EEOC which determined 
that U.S. Air may have committed discrimination when it denied 
Barnett’s request for a reasonable accommodation.55  Barnett sued 
and the district court granted summary judgment for U.S. Air.56  
Barnett appealed, arguing that a violation of the ADA occurred when 
U.S. Air failed to extend his mail room reassignment request.57  The 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court decision, stating that 
 
45 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
46 See Ben Mutzabaugh, US Airways’ Final Flight Closes Curtain on Another 
Major Airline, USA TODAY (Oct. 15, 2015, 12:33 PM) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/2015/10/16/us-airways-final-flight-
american-merger/73922874 (discussing the name change of U.S. Air to U.S. 
Airways in 1997). 
47 Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc. 228 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated 




51 Id.  
52 Id. at 1109. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
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Barnett’s accommodation request was reasonable unless the 
employer could prove an undue hardship.58  The court held that 
reassignment, where an employer has a seniority system, requires a 
fact intensive analysis.59  The court continued by stating that “[i]f 
there is no undue hardship, a disabled employee who seeks 
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, if otherwise qualified 
for a position, should receive the position rather than merely have an 
opportunity to compete with non-disabled employees.”60 
U.S. Airways petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, 
asking the Court to decide whether the ADA compels an employer 
who has an established seniority system to provide a disabled 
employee with a reassignment as a reasonable accommodation.61  
The Court summarized the parties’ interpretation of the ADA when a 
seniority system is involved.62  U.S. Airways argued that a violation 
of a seniority system would always be unreasonable.63  Barnett 
protested, stating that a violation of a seniority system could never be 
a definitive bar to a reasonable accommodation.64  Barnett conceded 
that a seniority system violation may show that an accommodation 
caused an undue hardship to the employer.65 
The Court began its analysis with U.S. Airways’ anti-
preference argument.66  U.S. Airways contended that the ADA does 
not “require an employer to grant preferential treatment” to disabled 
employees seeking reasonable accommodations.67  Rejecting this 
argument, the Court stated that sometimes preferences will be 
necessary to achieve the ADA’s equal opportunity goal.68  
Acknowledging that any accommodation can be deemed preferential, 
the Court declared that a difference in treatment which may violate a 
disability-neutral rule does not, by itself, render an accommodation 
unreasonable.69   
 
58 Id. at 1122. 
59 Id. at 1120. 
60 Id. 





66 Id. at 397. 
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Continuing its analysis, the Court discussed Barnett’s claim 
that a reasonable accommodation should only mean that the 
accommodation is effective.70  Barnett attempted to persuade the 
Court to only consider the “accommodation’s ability to meet an 
individual’s disability-related needs, and nothing more.”71  The Court 
rejected this argument explaining how an effective accommodation 
may be unreasonable because of its impact on fellow employees.72 
The Supreme Court then considered whether a disabled 
employee’s request for reassignment as an accommodation would be 
reasonable in light of an employer’s seniority system.73  The Court 
held that ordinarily such a request would be unreasonable and 
therefore “the seniority system will prevail.”74  The Court then 
proposed a two-step approach which would allow a disabled 
employee to show that an ordinarily unreasonable accommodation 
request in light of a seniority system was, in fact, reasonable.75  The 
disabled employee would need to show that the accommodation 
“seems reasonable on its face.”76  Once this occurs, the burden shifts 
to the employer to demonstrate an undue hardship.77  If the disabled 
employee is unable to show the accommodation is reasonable “in the 
run of cases,” the employee may be able to show special 
circumstances which would warrant a finding of reasonableness due 
to particular facts of the case.78  Ultimately, the Court held that 
ordinarily reassignment is not required under the ADA when it would 
violate a seniority system.79 
Unfortunately, no further direction has been given to disabled 
employees who are seeking reassignment outside of a seniority 
system.80  The lack of guidance has caused a noticeable divide 
amongst the United States Courts of Appeals.81   
 
70 Id. at 399. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 400. 
73 Id. at 402. 
74 Id. at 394. 
75 Id. at 401. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 401-02. 
78 Id. at 405. 
79 Id. at 406. 
80 United Airlines, Inc. v. EEOC, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (denying certiorari on a 
case involving reassignment in the face of a best-qualified hiring system). 
81 See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text. 
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IV. CIRCUITS THAT HOLD REASSIGNMENT SHOULD NOT BE 
MANDATORY 
A. Fifth Circuit 
In Daugherty v. City of El Paso,82 Carl Daugherty was a part-
time bus driver for the city of El Paso.83  While employed, Daugherty 
was diagnosed with a form of diabetes which made him insulin-
dependent.84  Once the city was made aware of the diagnosis, 
Daugherty was placed on leave without pay and he was eventually 
fired.85  Daugherty sued the city, claiming it violated the ADA by not 
accommodating his disability.86  At trial, a jury awarded Daugherty 
$5,000 in damages and the city appealed.87 
In this case, the city argued that Daugherty’s diabetes is not 
considered a disability under the ADA and therefore he is not a 
“qualified individual with a disability.”88  Daugherty conceded that 
he was unable to perform the essential parts of his duties as a bus 
driver after his diabetes diagnosis.89  However, Daugherty argued that 
he should have been eligible for reassignment as a reasonable 
accommodation.90   
The Fifth Circuit stated that a qualified person with a 
disability is one who can perform the essential duties of a job which 
he or she “holds or desires.”91  The court rejected the city’s position 
that “desires” only refers to positions sought by job applicants.92  
Instead, the Fifth Circuit read the statutory language as including 
employees who become disabled, since the overall purpose of the 
ADA is to prohibit discrimination during hiring, firing, advancement, 
and other “privileges of employment.”93 
 
82 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995). 





88 Id. at 697.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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The city offered the governing city charter as evidence to 
support its employment practices.94  Although employees who were 
physically unable to perform their duties were given priority, the city 
explained that the process for filling vacancies required positions be 
filled by full-time employees before becoming available to part-time 
employees.95  The city surmised that if it were to give a vacant full-
time position to Daugherty, it would risk being sued.96 
Ultimately, the court held it “[does] not read the ADA as 
requiring affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities, 
in the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given priority in 
hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled.”97  
Additionally, the court stated the ADA “prohibits employment 
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, no more 
and no less.”98 
B. Eighth Circuit 
The Eight Circuit held in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores99 that an 
employer may reject a reasonable accommodation request for 
reassignment, if the accommodation would violate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory hiring policy which requires the employer to fill 
the position with the most qualified candidate.100  In this case, Pam 
Huber was a grocery order filler for Wal-Mart.101  While working, 
Huber permanently injured her right arm which hindered her ability 
to perform the essential aspects of her job.102  Huber requested 
reassignment to a vacant router position, which was equivalent in pay 
to her current position, but Wal-Mart denied the transfer.103  Instead, 
Wal-Mart required Huber to apply for and compete with other 





97 Id. at 700. 
98 Id. 
99 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007). 
100 Id. at 483. 
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the router position, Wal-Mart hired a non-disabled applicant.105  The 
parties agreed that although Huber was qualified, she was not the 
“most qualified candidate” which is why she was passed over for the 
job.106  Wal-Mart eventually reassigned Huber to another facility as a 
maintenance associate which paid less than half of her original 
wages.107   
The court considered whether an employer, as an 
accommodation, is required to give an employee preference in 
transferring to a position that is vacant, if the employee is not the 
most qualified person vying for the position.108  The Eighth Circuit 
held that “the ADA is not an affirmative action statute and does not 
require an employer to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a 
vacant position when such reassignment would violate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most qualified 
candidate.”109  The court reasoned that Huber was not discriminated 
against when Wal-Mart chose an applicant who had superior 
qualifications.110  Ultimately, the court held that Huber “was treated 
exactly as all other candidates were treated for the Wal-Mart job 
opening, no worse and no better.”111  
C. Eleventh Circuit 
In EEOC v. St Joseph’s Hospital Inc.,112 the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided that an employer was not required to 
reassign a disabled employee without competition, nor was it 
required to give a disabled employee preferential treatment.113  In this 
case, Leokadia Bryk was working in the psychiatric ward of St. 
Joseph’s Hospital as a nurse for approximately twenty-one years.114  
In 2002, she was diagnosed with spinal stenosis which caused her to 





108 Id. at 482. 
109 Id. at 483 (footnote omitted). 
110 Id. at 484. 
111 Id. 
112 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016). 
113 Id. at 1345. 
114 Id. at 1337. 
115 Id. at 1338. 
12
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After the surgery, she depended on a cane for support and to alleviate 
back pain.117  Bryk continued to work in the hospital’s psychiatric 
ward with her cane until 2011, when she was demoted from Charge 
Nurse to Clinical Nurse II for violating procedures.118  During the 
disciplinary action, the hospital became concerned that patients could 
use Bryk’s cane as a weapon.119  Bryk was given thirty days to find 
and apply for another position if she wanted to remain employed.120  
However, Bryk was required to compete with other applicants for any 
position for which she applied.121  Although she applied for seven 
positions, she did not qualify for any position.122  Bryk freely 
admitted that certain medical or surgical positions would not be 
appropriate because she had only worked in psychiatric or drug 
dependency units for the last twenty-one years.123   
The Eleventh Circuit began by analyzing whether Bryk was 
“disabled” under the ADA, and determined, that her physical 
impairment was limiting enough to deem her disabled.124  The court 
also analyzed whether Bryk was a “qualified individual.”125  The 
ADA defines a “qualified individual” as one who can perform the 
duties of the position he or she holds or desires.126  Using this 
definition, the court found that Bryk was qualified.127  Once the court 
determined Bryk was a qualified disabled employee, it analyzed 
whether the ADA requires reassignment to a vacant position without 
competition.128 
The court concluded that “the ADA does not require 
reassignment without competition for, or preferential treatment of, 
the disabled.”129  The Eleventh Circuit reached this conclusion by 
suggesting that the use of the word “may,” when referring to 
 
116 Id. 







124 Id. at 1344. 
125 Id. 
126 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
127 St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1344. 
128 Id. at 1345. 
129 Id. 
13
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reassignment as a possible reasonable accommodation, means that 
reassignment should not be mandatory.130  Continuing its analysis, 
the court used the framework in Barnett131 to examine whether 
reassignment should be mandatory.132  The Eleventh Circuit decided 
that reassignment is not reasonable if it violates an employer’s “best-
qualified hiring or transfer policy.”133  The court rationalized this 
decision by stating that “[p]assing over the best-qualified job 
applicants in favor of less-qualified ones is not [] reasonable.”134  
Eventually, the Eleventh Circuit determined that undermining the 
employer’s “best-qualified hiring or transfer policy” would impose a 
substantial hardship.135 
D. Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit recently decided Elledge v. Lowe’s Home 
Ctrs., LLC.136  In this case, Chuck Elledge began working for Lowe’s 
in 1993.137  Over the course of his employment, Elledge was 
promoted multiple times, ultimately becoming a Market Director of 
Stores.138  This position required Elledge to oversee dozens of stores, 
which performed well under his supervision.139   
In 2014, Elledge had knee replacement surgery on his right 
knee.140  He was eventually cleared to return to work but with 
restrictions.141  Lowe’s complied with the doctor’s restrictions and, 
for a time, allowed Elledge to modify the time he spent walking 
through the stores.142  After renewing his accommodations, Lowe’s 
 
130 Id. (“The ADA does not say or imply that reassignment is always reasonable. To 
the contrary, the use of the word “may” implies just the opposite: that reassignment 
will be reasonable in some circumstances but not in others.”). 
131 See U.S. Airways, Inc. v Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002). 
132 St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1346 (discussing the Barnett framework.); see 
supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
133 St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1346. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 979 F.3d 1004 (4th Cir. 2020). 
137 Id. at 1007. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 1008.  
142 Id. 
14
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learned that Elledge would be issued a permanent disability parking 
placard.143  Upon hearing this, Lowe’s contacted Elledge’s doctor and 
learned that Elledge’s restrictions would become permanent.144  Once 
this information was confirmed, the Regional Human Resources 
Director voiced her concerns regarding Elledge’s permanent medical 
restrictions.145  
Eventually, Elledge was told he would no longer be able to 
remain the Market Director of Stores.146  Elledge applied for two 
director-level positions but was rejected for both under Lowe’s 
succession planning policy.147  Eventually, Elledge accepted early 
retirement with a severance package, but later sued claiming ADA 
violations.148 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by 
determining that Elledge was not able to fulfill the essential duties of 
his current position.149  Elledge argued that even though he was 
unable to perform the duties of his job, Lowe’s violated the ADA by 
not reassigning him to a comparable vacant position.150  The Fourth 
Circuit described reassignment as a balancing act between the rights 
of the disabled employee, the employer, and other employees.151  The 
court contended that de-emphasizing reassignment allows for a better 
relationship between disabled and non-disabled employees.152  The 
Fourth Circuit reasoned that reassignment would deplete workplace 
morale if a disabled employee were to disrupt the expectations of 
those employees who are not disabled.153  The court analogized 
Lowe’s merit-based advancement system to the seniority system 
present in Barnett.154  The court concluded that Lowe’s practice of 
consistently identifying and advancing employees, based on a 








149 Id. at 1011. 
150 Id. at 1013-14. 
151 Id. at 1014. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1015-16. 
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automatic seniority-system in Barnett.155  Ultimately, the Fourth 
Circuit decided that reassignment in violation of Lowe’s 
advancement policies would not be reasonable.156 
V. CIRCUITS THAT SUPPORT MANDATORY REASSIGNMENT TO 
A VACANT POSITION 
A. Seventh Circuit 
 i. Pre Barnett Decision 
The significance of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
holding in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc.,157 requires a discussion of 
EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.158  In Humiston-Keeling, Nancy 
Cook Houser was working in a pharmaceutical products warehouse 
as a product picker.159  Houser was involved in a work accident 
which led to severe tennis elbow, diminishing her ability to lift items 
with her right arm.160  The employer originally attempted to 
accommodate Houser in her current warehouse position by “rigg[ing] 
an apron” so she could continue to carry items to the conveyor with 
her left arm.161  When this accommodation was unsuccessful, Houser 
was reassigned to a temporary greeter position.162  Once the 
temporary position ended, Houser applied for vacant clerical 
positions within the company.163  Although qualified, Houser was 
passed over in favor of other applicants, and was eventually let go.164 
The Seventh Circuit Court rejected the EEOC’s position that 
an employer is required to reassign a qualified disabled employee, 
absent an undue hardship.165  The court reasoned that the EEOC’s 
interpretation would require “employers to give bonus points to 
 
155 Id. at 1016. 
156 Id. 
157 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). 
158 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). 





164 Id. at 1026-27. 
165 Id. at 1027. 
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people with disabilities.”166  Further, the court rejected the EEOC’s 
argument that if the reasonable accommodation merely allowed 
Houser to compete, there would be nothing “left of the duty to 
reassign a disabled worker.”167  The court asserted that plenty is left, 
including the employer’s consideration regarding the feasibility of 
assigning disabled workers to positions in which their disabilities 
“will not be an impediment to full performance.”168  Once the 
employer determines that reassignment is feasible, then the 
reasonable accommodation is mandatory, as long as the employer is 
not required “to turn away a superior applicant.”169  Ultimately, the 
Seventh Circuit held that “the ADA does not require an employer to 
reassign a disabled employee to a job for which there is a better 
applicant, provided it’s the employer’s consistent and honest policy 
to hire the best applicant for the particular job in question rather than 
the first qualified applicant.”170 
 ii. Post Barnett Decision 
In EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc.,171 the EEOC urged the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to revise its interpretation of 
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation.172  The EEOC 
contended that the holding in Barnett undermines the court’s 
previous ruling in Humiston-Keeling.173  Further, the EEOC argued 
that “the ADA requires employers to reassign employees, who will 
lose their current positions due to disability, to a vacant position for 
which they are qualified.”174 
In this case, the EEOC sued United Airlines in district court, 
alleging that the company’s reasonable accommodation guidelines 
violated the ADA.175  The district court dismissed the case citing the 
binding precedent in Humiston-Keeling, which held that a policy 
 




170 Id. at 1029. 
171 673 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated 693 F.3d 760 (2012). 
172 Id. at 543. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 543-44. 
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requiring competition for a disabled employee requesting a 
reasonable accommodation was not a violation of the ADA.176  
EEOC’s contention that the Barnett decision undermined Humiston-
Keeling, was also rejected by the district court.177 
Although the Seventh Circuit believed that the EEOC’s 
interpretation of reassignment under the ADA “may in fact be more 
supportable,” the court stated that overruling a prior decision is “no 
easy task.”178  The court explained that the EEOC needed to provide 
a “compelling reason to deviate from precedent,” by showing that the 
court’s “established interpretation of the ADA in Humiston-Keeling 
is no longer viable after Barnett.”179 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit decided that EEOC’s 
arguments were not persuasive enough to show that the decision in 
Humiston-Keeling was no longer good law.180  However, the court 
did recommend “en banc consideration of the present case since the 
logic of EEOC’s position . . . is persuasive with or without 
consideration of Barnett.”181 
In September of 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided that its 
holding in Humiston-Keeling was no longer valid after Barnett.182  
The court held “that the ADA does indeed mandate that an employer 
appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they 
are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be 
ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that 
employer.”183  The court continued by noting that a “best qualified 
selection policy” is not similar to a “seniority system.”184  The court 
explained that “[w]hile employers may prefer to hire the best 
qualified applicant, violation of a best-qualified selection policy” 
does not create the same concerns and burdens as a violation of a 
seniority system.185  Since the Supreme Court has held that 
reassignment to a vacant position, absent an undue hardship, is 
 
176 Id. at 544. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 545-46. 
180 Id. at 546. 
181 Id. at 546-47. 
182 EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012). 
183 Id. at 761. 
184 Id. at 764. 
185 Id. 
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reasonable, “an employer must implement such a reassignment 
policy.”186 
B. Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Smith v. Midland 
Brake, Inc.187 that reassignment to a vacant position “must mean 
something more than the mere opportunity to apply for a job with the 
rest of the world.”188  In this case, Robert Smith worked in the light 
assembly department for nearly seven years as a tester of valve 
components for the air brakes of large vehicles.189  During his 
employment, Smith developed a chronic skin irritation and muscular 
injuries from constant contact with chemicals.190  Smith’s injuries 
were so severe that his physicians restricted his work activities and 
recommended that he avoid further exposure to irritants, and at times, 
ordered him to abstain from work for limited periods.191  Smith 
acknowledged that his physician considered him permanently 
disabled and unfit to continue working in the assembly department.192  
Smith also contended that given his limitations, his employer was 
incapable of finding him a position in his current department.193  
Midland Brake eventually fired Smith because it was unable to 
accommodate him in the light assembly department.194 
Smith sued Midland Brake alleging that it failed to reasonably 
accommodate him, but the District Court of Kansas entered summary 
judgment for Midland Brake.195  The District Court held that Smith 
“was not a qualified individual with a disability” because he never 
provided Midland Brake with a medical release which would allow 
him to return to work.196  The Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court’s judgment, concluding that “no amount of accommodation 
 
186 Id. 
187 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
188 Id. at 1164. 
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could allow Smith to perform his existing job.”197  The Tenth Circuit 
agreed to rehear Smith’s ADA claim en banc.198 
The Tenth Circuit began with a detailed discussion regarding 
the interpretation of the ADA’s requirements.199  The court discussed 
the statutory framework of the ADA, noting that the threshold issue, 
whether the employee is qualified, must be met.200  Midland Brake 
argued that since Smith was unable to perform the essential function 
of his existing job, he did not meet the definition of qualified.201  The 
court disagreed with Midland’s argument, determining that although 
an individual must be able to “perform the essential function of a 
job,” that does not mean only his existing job.202  The ADA’s 
language includes other jobs the disabled employee “desires” as long 
as he or she is able to fulfill the duties required by the position, 
otherwise the word is meaningless.203  The Tenth Circuit supported 
this conclusion by examining the definition of reasonable 
accommodation and suggesting that reassignment to a vacant 
position, “includes a reassignment from the employee’s current job to 
one that he or she desires.”204  Building on this reading of the ADA, 
the court pointed to the House Committee on Education and Labor 
report which stated that if a disabled employee can no longer perform 
the essential functions of the job, “a transfer to another vacant job for 
which the person is qualified may prevent the employee from being 
out of work and [the] employer from losing a valuable worker.”205  
Further, the court determined that a qualified employee with a 
disability is one who can perform the duties of “an appropriate 
reassignment job within the company, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, even though he or she cannot perform their existing 





200 Id. at 1161. 
201 Id.  (“The ADA defines a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ as an individual 
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 




205 Id. at 1162. 
206 Id. 
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The court also addressed the argument in Judge Kelly’s 
dissenting opinion.207  Judge Kelly suggested that the ADA only 
grants the disabled employee equal consideration of their application 
for the vacant position.208  The Tenth Circuit found this interpretation 
too narrow since it would undermine the literal meaning of 
reassignment and render the statutory language a “nullity.”209  The 
court reasoned that reassignment requires an employer to do 
“something more” than merely allow a disabled employee the 
opportunity to apply for a vacant position.210  Additionally, the court 
pointed out that the ADA already prohibits employers from 
discriminating against disabled employees, whether they are an 
outside applicant or one who is seeking reassignment.211  The Tenth 
Circuit inferred that if reassignment merely meant that an employer is 
required to consider an existing disabled employee alongside other 
applicants, the language would be redundant since those protections 
are already afforded in the application process.212 
Further, the court focused on the EEOC Interpretive Guidance 
to show that merely considering a disabled employee’s application 
for reassignment would amount to a “hollow promise” because the 
right to ask for reassignment is not equal to “reassignment itself.”213  
If a disabled employee did not have the right to reassignment, but 
only had the right to request a reassignment then the: 
employer could merely go through the meaningless 
process of consideration of a disabled employee's 
application for reassignment and refuse it in every 
instance.  It would be cold comfort for a disabled 
employee to know that his or her application was 
“considered” but that he or she was nevertheless still 
out of a job—a job to which he or she was otherwise 
qualified and as to which he or she had a reasonable 
claim to reassignment.214 
 





212 Id. at 1164-65. 
213 Id. at 1167. 
214 Id. at 1167. 
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Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit concluded that an employee is entitled 
to reassignment to a vacant position as one of several reasonable 
accommodations an employer must consider if a disabled employee 
is unable to perform the essential duties of his or her position.215 
C. District of Columbia Circuit 
In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center,216 the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer is obligated 
to do more than simply allow disabled employees to apply and 
compete for a vacant position.217  The court noted that the ADA’s 
“reference to reassignment would be redundant if permission to apply 
were all it meant.”218   
Etim Aka worked as an operating room orderly at Washington 
Hospital Center (WHC) for nineteen years before needing bypass 
surgery.219  He spent several months in rehabilitation before receiving 
permission from his doctor to return to work with a light to moderate 
duty restriction.220  Aka asked WHC for a transfer to a compatible job 
which adhered to his medical restrictions, but they refused to do 
so.221  WHC insisted that Aka was responsible for searching the job 
postings for vacant positions.222  Aka applied for several positions, 
but he was passed over for all of them.223 
Aka sued WHC alleging, among other things, a violation of 
the ADA by failing to reassign him to a vacant position.224  The 
District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary 
judgment for WHC, but a panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed and 
 
215 Id. 
216 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
217 Id. 1305. 
218 Id. at 1304. 
219 Id. at 1286. 
220 Id.  
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 1287. 
224 Id. 
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [], Art. 19
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/19
2021 QUALIFIED DOES NOT MEAN OVER-QUALIFIED 1075 
remanded the reasonable accommodation claim.225  WHC requested a 
rehearing of the case en banc.226 
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis regarding Aka’s 
reassignment claim by addressing whether he was “otherwise 
qualified.”227  WHC claimed that since Aka was unable to perform 
his duties as an orderly, the Hospital was not obligated to grant him a 
reasonable accommodation.228  The court indicated that WHC 
misread the statute, determining that a disabled employee is entitled 
to seek reassignment if he or she can perform the essential duties of 
the desired job.229  The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the EEOC 
guidelines and the legislative history of the ADA “both support this 
reading.”230  In the end, the court held that WHC is required to 
reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability unless it can 
demonstrate an undue hardship.231 
VI. USING QUALIFICATION AS A PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION 
In general, discrimination against disabled individuals has 
been well established in employment.232  Before the enactment of the 
ADA, misconceptions about persons with disabilities was extremely 
prevalent.233  This level of misunderstanding was brought to light 
when “[e]very government and private study on the issue has shown 
that employers disfavor hiring persons with disabilities.”234 
A. Qualified Means Qualified 
The courts holding that reassignment should not be mandatory 
are missing the point of a reasonable accommodation.  These courts 
are analyzing whether an employee should be given preference for a 
position if he or she is not the most qualified.  For example, the 
 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 1288. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 1301. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 1303. 
232 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 28-29. (describing the 
discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities). 
233 Id. at 71. 
234 Id. at 71. 
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Eighth Circuit decided that Wal-Mart did not discriminate against 
Huber when it declined her reasonable accommodation request.235  
The court’s position is that an employer is only required to provide an 
accommodation that is reasonable and not an accommodation that the 
employee perceives as ideal.236  The court’s position minimizes 
Huber’s claim because it suggests that this case is no more than a 
squabble about an employee not receiving her first reassignment 
choice, when in fact, it is much more than that.   
Under the ADA, a qualified disabled employee is one who 
has the requisite skill to perform the fundamental duties of the job he 
or she holds or desires.237  There is no mention of “superior 
qualifications.”  In fact, the EEOC’s formal regulations specifically 
prohibit using qualification standards which may tend to exclude 
individuals with disabilities.238  Although the language here seems 
quite plain, some law review authors postulate that being qualified 
means something more in relation to the reasonable accommodation 
of reassignment.239   
In one article, a fictional employer has an opening for a typist, 
where typing speed is an essential part of the position.240  The 
employer has stated that applicants must maintain a minimum typing 
speed of fifty words-per-minute.241  The author then states that two 
people apply for the position, one who types 120 words-per-minute, 
with flawless accuracy, and one who is disabled typing fifty words 
per minute, with just above average accuracy.242  The hypothetical 
goes on to say that although the one applicant is “more qualified,” the 
position is given to the other applicant based solely on his 
disability.243  The author makes sure to specify that the employer has 
 
235 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007). 
236 Id. (referring to the holding of Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. 
City. 214 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
237 42 U.S.C. §12111(8). 
238 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (2011). 
239 Taylor Brooke Concannon, Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater: 
Taking the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. Too Far 
[693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012)], 52 WASHBURN L. J. 613, 613 (2013); Edward G. 
Guedes, Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. – Writing Affirmative Action into the 
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a “bona fide policy of hiring the most-qualified applicant for each 
available position.”244 
This hypothetical is misconstruing the meaning of qualified.  
The ADA does not require a disabled individual to have superior 
qualifications and flawless accuracy.  As previously mentioned, the 
ADA states that a disabled employee needs to be able to carry out the 
duties of the job to which he or she wants to transfer.245  In an attempt 
to highlight the inaccuracy of a superior qualification standard, the 
Tenth Circuit states that an employer commits discrimination if it 
fails to reasonably accommodate a qualified disabled person.246  The 
court explains that if a reasonable accommodation cannot keep an 
employee in an existing job, then reassignment may be necessary as 
long as the job is vacant, the employee has the necessary 
qualifications, and the reassignment does not create a burden to the 
employer.247  Requiring anything more, such as demanding the 
employee requesting reassignment “be the best qualified employee 
for the vacant job, is judicial gloss unwarranted by the statutory 
language or its legislative history.”248  Essentially, if an employee can 
perform the duties outlined by an employer, then that employee is 
qualified.  Again, the Tenth Circuit explains: 
We have no quarrel with the proposition that an 
employer, when confronted with two initial job 
applicants for a typing position, one of whom types 50 
words a minute while the other types 75 words a 
minute, may hire the person with the higher typing 
speed, notwithstanding the fact that the slower typist 
has a disability. However, the legislative history 
clearly distinguishes between the affirmative action of 
modifying the essential functions of a job (which is 
not required) and the duty to reassign a disabled 
person to an existing vacant job, if necessary, to 
enable the disabled person to keep his or her 
employment with the company (which is required).249 
 
244 Id. 
245 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
246 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 1168. 
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This example provided by the court exemplifies the importance of 
mandating the reassignment reasonable accommodation for disabled 
employees.  Without mandatory reassignment, disabled employees 
are forced to compete for positions which they are already qualified 
for. 
No other reasonable accommodation requires the disabled 
employee to compete for the privilege.250  An employee requesting a 
talk-to-text headset as an accommodation does not have to compete 
in order to stay in his or her current position.251  Unfortunately, 
several misguided circuit courts are mandating competition for 
disabled employees requesting a reassignment.252 
B. Some Preferences Are Needed Despite Disability 
Neutral Rules 
When read and interpreted carefully, the language of the ADA 
already supports preferences and at times mandates employers to 
depart from their neutral policies.  For instance, Congress began by 
prohibiting employers from using any standards or criteria that may 
have an adverse effect on those with disabilities.253  This mandatory 
departure from an employer’s already established policies shows that 
Congress intended extensive reforms in order to afford disabled 
employees the same opportunities as their non-disabled counterparts. 
Regrettably, some courts have misinterpreted the ADA’s 
purpose and disabled employees are once again facing additional 
obstacles.  The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in St. Joseph’s Hospital, 
Inc. is a good example of an unnecessary hurdle.254  As previously 
discussed, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the ADA does not require 
reassignment without competition for, or preferential treatment of, 
the disabled.”255  Here, the court decided that it would be 
unreasonable to require an employer to reassign a disabled employee 
if it would violate the employer’s best-qualified transfer policy.256  
 
250 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
251 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21 at, 33, 56, 63 (describing typical 
accommodations which must be provided by employers). 
252 See supra notes 8- 10, 14, and accompanying text. 
253 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A). 
254 EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. Inc., 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016). 
255 Id. at 1345. 
256 Id. at 1346. 
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The court mistakenly determined that the ADA only requires equal 
opportunity and not preferential treatment.257  This could not be 
further from the truth. 
Several of the reasonable accommodations listed already 
require employers to provide preferences to disabled employees.258  
For example, employers may be required to modify work schedules, 
restructure jobs, and adjust training protocols, violating their own 
neutral policies in order to adhere to the ADA.259  Even the Supreme 
Court stated in Barnett that “preferences will sometimes prove 
necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.”260  The 
Court further explained that contravening “an employer’s disability-
neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the 
Act’s potential reach.”261  In fact, the Court plainly stated that 
permitting a disabled worker to violate rules that others must obey 
does not automatically make an accommodation unreasonable.262 
C. Non-disabled Employees and Employers Already Have 
Protections 
Another major concern is that employers and non-disabled 
employees will be unduly burdened or discriminated against if 
reassignment were to become mandatory.263  This is the most 
baseless concern of all.  Employers and non-disabled employees 
already have several protections including qualification standards,264 
undue hardships,265 and Barnett’s decision regarding seniority 
systems.266  Of course, even with several protections in place, courts 
continue to decide that reassignment requires competition.267   
In another law review author’s hypothetical, there is an 
employee who during the course of his employment, suffers an 
 
257 Id. 
258 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
259 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 
260 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002). 
261 Id. (explaining how neutral rules would restrict the reasonable accommodation 
objective). 
262 Id. at 398. 
263 See supra Part IV. 
264 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra notes 8, 9, 10, 14, and accompanying text. 
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accident that renders him disabled and incapable of performing the 
essential functions of his position, with or without an 
accommodation.268  There is a vacant position for which the disabled 
employee is qualified but there is an applicant with more experience 
who is also interested in the position.269  The company would rather 
hire the outside applicant but it reassigns the disabled employee 
instead.270  Again, this author’s hypothetical involves a disabled 
employee who is mediocre and only adequately performing.271  
Under the ADA, adequate and mediocre have no meaning in relation 
to reassignment.  A disabled employee is either qualified or not.272 
The ADA explicitly defines a qualified person with a 
disability as one who can carry out the essential function of the 
job.273  The phrase “essential functions” is included to solidify an 
employers’ control over job requirements for disabled applicants and 
employees.274  As long as the “essential functions” are not marginal, 
the employer can use job descriptions as a method of weeding out 
underperforming employees.275   
Additionally, the ADA states “consideration shall be given to 
the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, 
and if an employer has prepared a written description before 
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description 
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”276  
This gives employers the ability to produce meaningful job 
descriptions which allow them to decide what functions are 
necessary.  Disabled employees should not be subjected to a 
“superior qualification” standard as a means for employers to 
disqualify them from access to a reasonable accommodation.   
As an additional safeguard, employers may show that a 
reasonable accommodation request would cause an undue 
 
268 Edward G. Guedes, Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. – Writing Affirmative Action 




272 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
273 Id. 
274 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 55. 
275 Id.  
276 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
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hardship.277  For example, in Daugherty, the case involves an 
established seniority system which, if violated, would cause an undue 
hardship for the employer.278  As discussed above, vacant positions 
were filled by full-time employees before being offered to part-time 
employees.279  The Fifth Circuit held that the ADA does not require 
an employer to give a disabled employee priority in reassignment 
over a non-disabled employee.280  The court found that Daugherty’s 
claim failed because he was not “treated differently from any other 
part-time employee whose job was eliminated.”281  Although the 
court was correct, at the time, in deciding that Daugherty’s claim 
should fail, the court should have focused on the undue hardship to 
the employer.282  Instead, the court included additional unnecessary 
commentary claiming that the ADA does not require affirmative 
action for the disabled employee.283   
Lastly, the Barnett two-part test helps employers who have 
legitimate, non-discriminatory, seniority systems.284  The Barnett 
decision makes a disabled employee’s reassignment request 
unreasonable if the employer has a legitimate seniority system in 
place.285  This shifts the burden to the disabled employee, who must 
now prove that the reassignment request was reasonable.286  Only if 
the disabled employee was successful, would the burden then shift 
back to the employer to show that the request would cause an undue 
hardship.287  This would effectively provide another safeguard for 
employers faced with reasonable accommodation requests. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As outlined above, it is clear the ADA was enacted to place 
disabled employees on a level playing field.288  The ADA is not 
 
277 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
278 Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995). 
279 Id. at 699. 
280 Id. at 700. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 699. 
283 Id. at 700. 
284 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
288 See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. 
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meant to undermine an employer’s right to “choose and maintain 
qualified workers.”289  The statute provides employers with guidance 
in order to end discrimination against disabled individuals.290 
Reassignment to a vacant position is called the 
accommodation of last resort for a reason.291  At the point of a 
request for reassignment, the disabled worker and the employer 
would have already explored other forms of reasonable 
accommodations292 and come to the conclusion that they were not 
feasible.  Requiring an employee who is already disabled to compete 
for the ability to have an accommodation goes against the plain 
meaning of the statute.  No other reasonable accommodation requires 
the employee to compete, but without some clear direction disabled 
employees in many regions are required to compete in order to retain 
employment.  
Without mandatory reassignment to a vacant position, the 
disabled worker will no longer be on a level playing field.  In a post-
Barnett293 world, the federal circuit courts should take note of EEOC 
v. United Airlines, Inc., and follow the Seventh Circuits guidance.294  
A most-qualified hiring and transfer policy should not surpass a 
request for reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, unless the 
employer can show an undue hardship.295  Disabled individuals have 
enough to worry about.  They should not have to worry about 
inconsistent interpretations of the ADA working against them. 
 
289 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), supra note 21, at 55. 
290 Id. at 22. 
291 See supra notes 42-44. 
292 See supra note 23. 
293 See supra notes 45-81.  
294 See supra notes 185-189 (discussing the Seventh Circuit holding that the ADA 
mandates reassignment for disabled employees who are qualified unless the 
employer can prove an undue hardship). 
295 See supra notes 185-189. 
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